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Global Interdependence begins with an evocative epitaph: “A man without bias cannot write interesting
history—if, indeed, such a man exists.” The quote, which
comes from Bertrand Russell’s memoirs, introduces this
diverse overview of the world after 1945. As editor, Akira
Iriye explains, his biases include a commitment to contributing a fresh perspective on the recent past, a desire
to place this perspective in a truly global frame, and a devotion to explicating the layers of transnational history.
Although these layers, which he identifies as geopolitics, economics, the environment, and cultural exchange,
converged at different points after 1945, each has a distinct story and chronology, and each layer receives separate treatment in Global Interdependence’s five chapters.
Readers looking for a new take on the driving force of
history will have to look elsewhere; this is a tome about
interactions. Transnational exchange happened “across
borders, among people and their communities, ideas, and
goods, to such an extent that, whether we are talking
about political, economic, social, or cultural affairs, the
destinies of nations, civilizations, individuals, and the
natural habitat become closely linked” (p. 4). Presented
with an admirable terseness, Iriye’s argument straddles
the line between understatement and provocation: the
world achieved interdependence after 1945.

others—and Global Interdependence might be read as an
intervention in U.S. and the world history. That field,
which barely existed a decade ago, emerged arguably
from the confluence of diplomatic history with immigration and global studies during the early 2000s.[1] When
viewed alongside Rosenberg’s volume, Global Interdependence provides a capacious starting point to think about
this nascent historiography. The United States percolates
nearly every page of Iriye’s tome, but the authors are
as interested in the world as in the United States. Wilfried Loth explores the superpower contest through the
prism of European unity; Zeiler illuminates how Washington shaped (and was shaped by) postwar capitalism;
McNeill and Peter Engelke place this period in the context of population and energy concerns; Goedde explains
the way diversity and homogenization interacted in the
age of cultural globalization; and Iriye offers a précis on
transnationalism. Paired with Rosenberg, Global Interdependence articulates a vision of the field that is less about
the United States than about the line that defines this curious category of U.S./world. The book walks this line
expertly—a challenge that has organized recent meetings
of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)—and does so in a way that showcases the
field’s obvious methodological diversity.[2] The resulting
narrative invites historians to rethink the context around
and the significance of America’s rise to power during
the twentieth century.

Clocking in at over nine hundred pages, Global Interdependence can be unpacked in various ways. Like
its predecessor, A World Connecting, 1870-1945 (2012),
which was edited by Emily Rosenberg and published in
2012, Iriye’s volume consists of long interpretive essays
that both synthesize recent scholarship and reflect the
predilections of each contributor. Historians of U.S. foreign relations will recognize many of the authors—Petra
Goedde, J. R. McNeill, and Thomas W. Zeiler, among

Yet Global Interdependence’s intellectual ambitions go
beyond the United States. Iriye’s volume is the sixth book
of the History of the World series, which he is assembling with Jürgen Osterhammel and publishing jointly
with Harvard University Press and C. H. Beck. Beginning
in prehistoric times, this multivolume project promises
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to articulate a genealogy of a peculiar historical subject:
transnational consciousness. The journal New Global
Studies has cultivated this scholarly agenda since 2007,
feeding on recent writings by Christopher Bayly, Charles
Bright, Michael Geyer, Bruce Mazlish, Osterhammel, and
Saskia Sassen, among others, and Iriye’s book is an elaboration of this larger pedagogical endeavor.[3] World historians will not find references to peripheries, cores, or
longue durées in Global Interdependence, nor will they
learn anything new about the rise and fall of great powers.[4] Iriye’s project is about connections and interactions. “We need a conceptual hold on the experience
of a world that is defined by its globality,” Bright and
Geyer wrote recently. It is not enough to define this effort by scale or theory; what is needed is a history that
reveals why communities became interlocked and how
they found meaning in that experience.[5] The History of
the World series might be read as an answer to this clarion call; Iriye’s Global Interdependence undoubtedly has
much to say about the history of “globality” or the horizontal planes of action that give life the globalization experience. “Post-1945 history shows numerous instances
of incomprehension toward unfamiliar people and objects,” Iriye admits. But more important is the “growth
of the realization that men, women, children, the spaces
they inhabit, and animals, birds, fish, and plants are all
interdependent beings” (p. 8). The story of this realization, unfurled here with editorial acumen, represents one
way to conceptualize global history.

ness of this claim is matched by the authors’ skepticism
toward geo-engineering, giving their essay an ambiguity
distinct from Global Interdependence’s other chapters.[8]
On the topic of culture, Goedde and Iriye provide similar
accounts about non-state activism and global consciousness. Goedde is more interested in women and local tradition than Iriye—her essay wrestles fruitfully with cultural hybridity—but her final conclusions do not depart
from Iriye’s wider assessment of the post-1945 world: interdependence is too big to fail.[9] In the face of a tightening network of people, goods, and ideas, where intellectuals grope daily for a cosmopolitanism that befits our
global condition, these individual chapters ultimately assemble to answer the most basic of questions: How did
we get here?

A book this ambitious invites big questions and constructive criticism. Periodization, for instance, will always vex historians and Iriye’s decision to begin this
story in 1945 carries baggage. On the one hand, 1945
is the obvious marker because it marks the origins of
the Cold War. On the other hand, this choice masks
the impact of World War II. While Rosenberg’s contributors mostly oriented their chapters backward toward
the nineteenth century, treating the Second World War
as an afterthought in the drama of industrialized globalization, the gaze here is cast forward toward contemporary times, leaving the most destructive conflict in human history out of focus for History of the World readers. Considering that conflict’s impact on ideas about
Each chapter provides its own twist on Iriye’s larger planning and citizenship, this is no small oversight.[10]
theme. Loth’s piece about the Cold War, for instance, One might counter that the arrival of the atomic bomb
is an interesting alternative to scholarship about the su- operated as a cross-cultural “reset” button, but nuclear
perpower contest in the Third World. His narrative be- questions are at Global Interdependence’s periphery and
gins and ends in Europe and explores how American- few of its chapters would be less cohesive if they covered
Soviet tensions interacted with the rise of an American- World War II itself. There is even an argument for beEuropean duopoly and the growth of state-making ex- ginning in 1914. The First Great War not only repudiated
periments in Asia.[6] Zeiler’s essay is equally accessi- European norms about civilization, but also marked New
ble. Starting with a nuanced portrait of U.S. power af- York’s arrival as the industrial world’s preeminent finanter World War II, he turns attention to political econ- cial center. By 1916 America was the largest economy on
omy, showing that while the recovery of the industrial- the planet, and even after Woodrow Wilson’s downfall in
ized world eroded Washington’s primacy during the Cold 1919, the United States continued to influence how counWar, the United States never abandoned its commitment tries came to terms with the vagaries of modern life.[11]
to opening economic doors around the world. This com- Beyond facilitating a comparison of the 1920s and 1990s,
mitment has been the beating heart of modern globaliza- a history that moved forward from 1914 might better illution.[7] McNeill and Peter Engelke shift attention to the minate the strange careers of import-substituting indusenvironment and themes of energy consumption, climate trialization, global governance, and postcolonial nationchange, and population growth. We are living through alism.[12] What are the trade-offs of dating globality’s
the dawn of the Anthropocene era, they argue, which has triumph to 1945?
seen humans supplant microbes and orbital wobbles as
Essay selection is also a topic that invites scholarly
the principle cause of environmental change. The bolddebate. Iriye provides an excellent balance here with two
2
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chapters about diplomacy and economics, another two
essays about interactions and consciousness, and a middle piece on the environment. One critique of A World
Connecting was that the essays were inadequately integrated, and a comparable argument can be made of
Global Interdependence.[13] The contributors occasionally talk past each other and their overlaps—which are
especially evident in the final two chapters—can be frustrating when read in light of the book’s omissions. China,
for instance, is everywhere and nowhere. Although Beijing shaped relations between the United States and Soviet Union and eventually altered the geography of capitalism, the country does not receive the same treatment
as Europe and North America, the lodestars of Loth’s and
Zeiler’s chapters respectively.[14] Similarly, the information revolution is omnipresent yet opaque. The contributors are interested in technology but ignore “big science,”
or the story of how public money fused with private research after the 1940s.[15] Change did not just happen,
and while treating this marriage as a lubricant of transnationalism may reflect how people experienced new technology, it also diminishes the political history of invention and diffusion. Likewise, Global Interdependence handles decolonization perfunctorily. Whereas Rosenberg’s
A World Connecting provided separate essays on statehood and imperialism, empire’s end is subsumed here
by the dramatic growth of globalization and the arrival
of transnational consciousness.[16] Essay selection is almost too easy to critique in a project with this many
moving parts, but each of these jabs points toward openended questions: Where does power reside in the modern
world? How should global historians balance causation
and description? As narrators, where should we plant
our feet—and who are “we”?

relevance of a history of global interdependence. This
sentiment finds expression throughout the current volume, especially as the contributors move from the historical past to the political present.[18] It also contrasts with
the recent proliferation of scholarship about inequality,
violence, and imperialism.[19] Indeed, in Iriye’s concluding chapter one can hear echoes of earlier refrains about
the world’s flatness, which will surely frustrate readers
who have joined Thomas Piketty’s bandwagon or find intellectual sustenance on the pages of n+1 and Jacobin.[20]
My students are certainly angrier than Iriye, even if they
disagree about where to direct their frustration. Most
of them have part-time jobs and outsized loans; they
come to the State University of New York with limited resources and heightened anxieties, and tend to take their
cultural cues from either Bill O’Reilly or Jon Stewart.
Comparable questions inform their interest in and awareness of global interdependence: Will they be better off
than their parents? What will technology change? Can
this planet sustain itself? [21] All of which raises the
specter of politics: In the face of these questions, is Iriye’s
cosmopolitanism too synonymous with the universalism
of a bygone age? Have past experiments with the Outline
of History—predicated on the conviction that transnationalism would cultivate habits coexistence and prevent
the recrudescence of “great” wars—already revealed the
shortcomings in the pedagogical enterprise that animates
History of the World? [22]

Iriye has earned his answers to these questions. Born
in Tokyo on the eve of World War II, he entered academia
at the Cold War’s highpoint and he has spent a lifetime
reflecting on the themes of Global Interdependence. The
book, and the series to which it belongs, is admirable and
impressive. It challenges U.S./world and global historians
Finally, there is bias. Russell would surely have in equal measure, nudging them to see globalization as a
thoughts about the above questions and he would be fas- historical object that unifies the disparate insights of pocinated by Iriye’s answers. Iriye has done much to his- litical, social, and cultural history. The individual chaptoricize the global community and his biases are more ters are excellent. But do not open these pages expecting
interesting than he suggests on Global Interdependence’s a compelling critique of power. Iriye’s call to arms is subopening pages. There is a Kantianism to his scholar- tle, mature, and elitist: we are one. The question remains,
ship since the mid-1990s, rooted in a deep, sophisticated is that enough?
interest in the connective tissue of world affairs. HavNotes
ing spent three decades writing about war and conflict—
namely, the American-Japanese antagonism during the
[1]. For representative examples of this confluence,
early twentieth century—Iriye’s turn toward transna- see Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algetional history hints at a cosmopolitanism that is both ria’s Fight for Independence and the Origin of the Postplacid and cavernous.[17] Global Interdependence pushes Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002);
readers to think about themselves in the widest possible Mai M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the
frame, urging scholars and laypeople alike to recognize Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton Unithe essential commonality of humankind—and realize the versity Press, 2004); and Akira Iriye, Global Community:
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The Role of International Organizations in the Making of
the Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Recent historiographical reviews include Thomas W. Zeiler, “The Diplomatic Bandwagon: A
State of the Field,” Journal of American History 95, no.
4 (March 2009): 1053-1073; Erez Manela, “The United
States in the World,” in American History Now, ed. Eric
Foner and Lisa McGirr (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2011), 201-220; Thomas Borstelmann, “A Worldly
Tale: Global Influences on the Historiography of U.S. Foreign Relations, in America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941, 2nd ed.,
ed. Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 338-360.

the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers
in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 19451963 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
[7]. The chapter complements Zeiler’s impressive
work on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), as well as Alfred E. Eckes Jr. and Thomas W.
Zeiler, Globalization and the American Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
[8]. The chapter enhances arguments in J. R. McNeill,
Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History
of the Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin, 2000).
[9]. Useful reflections on hybridity include Homi K.
Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004).

[2]. For a conversation about the field, see Matthew
Connelly, Robert J. McMahon, Katherine A. S. Sibley,
Thomas Borstelmann, Nathan Citino, and Kristin Hoganson, “SHAFR in the World,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review 42, no. 2
(September 2011): 4-16.

[10]. Some relevant work includes Christopher Bayly
and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: Britain’s Asian Empire and the War with Japan (New York: Penguin, 2005);
Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars: Freedom and Revolution in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French
and British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996); David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain 19201970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
and James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011).

[3]. For a conversation about the field, see C. A.
Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr,
Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed, “AHR Conversation: On
Transnational History,” American Historical Review 111,
no. 5 (December 2006): 1440-1464. Representative scholarship includes C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World,
1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2004); Bruce Mazlish, The New Global History (New York: Routledge, 2006); Jürgen Osterhammel,
The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the
[11]. Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the
Nineteenth Century, trans. Patrick Camiller (Princeton:
Remaking
of Global Order (New York: Penguin, 2014).
Princeton University Press, 2014); and Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assem[12]. Some relevant reflections include Cemil Aydin,
blage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
The Politics of Anti-Westernism: Visions of World Order in
[4]. For older variations on global history, see Im- Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Columbia
manuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, 4 vols. University Press, 2007); Sugata Bose, His Majesty’s Oppo(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974-2011); nent: Subhas Chandra Bose and India’s Struggle against
Fernand Braudel, On History, trans. Sarah Matthews Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); Pa(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Paul tricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: The ReinvenKennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic tion of the League of Nations, 1920-1946 (New York: OxChange and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: ford University Press, 2013); Daniel Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s (Cambridge:
Vintage, 1989).
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Minkah Makalani,
[5]. Charles Bright and Michael Geyer, “Benchmarks In the Cause of Freedom: Radical Black Internationalism
of Globalization: The Global Condition, 1850-2010,” in A from Harlem to London, 1917-1939 (Chapel Hill: UniverCompanion to World History, ed. Douglas Northrop (Ox- sity of North Carolina Press, 2011); Mark Mazower, Govford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 286.
erning the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Pen[6]. For an alternative approach, see Odd Arne Wes- guin, 2012); Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age
of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
tad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and
4

H-Net Reviews

Press, 2013); and John Waterbury, “The Long Gestation
and Brief Triumph of Import-Substituting Industrialization,” World Development 27, no. 2 (1999): 323-341.

bins, eds., Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond
the Nation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1998); and Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writings, 2nd
ed., ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1-53.

[13]. Donna R. Gabbacia, review of A World Connecting, ed. Emily Rosenberg, H-Diplo Roundtable Review 14,
no. 40 (July 2013): 20.

[18]. Loth, “Equations of Power,” 197-199; and Zeiler,
“Opening Doors,” 352-361.

[14]. Overviews of China’s journey include Odd Arne
Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750
(New York: Basic Books, 2012); and Jonathan Spence,
The Search for Modern China, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2012). China’s return to global prominence can
be seen fruitfully in the context of R. Bin Wong, China
Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997);
and Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China,
Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[19]. This literature has been eclectic, having grown
in the shadow of America’s imperial wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Some representative scholarship includes
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2000); Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore, eds., Lessons of Empire:
Imperial Histories and American Power (New York: New
Press, 2006); Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of
Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Charles
S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and
Its Predecessors (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2006); and Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End
of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). For a relevant historiography review, see Paul Kramer, “Power and
Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the
World,” American Historical Review 116, no. 5 (December
2011): 1348-1391.

[15]. David Reynolds, “Science, Technology, and the
Cold War,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War,
vol. 3, ed. Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 378; and
David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and
Global History since 1900 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006).

[16]. Charles S. Maier, “Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood,” in World Connecting: 1870-1945
[20]. Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 29-284;
History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Farrar,
and Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, “Empires
Straus and Giroux, 2005); and Thomas Piketty, Capital in
and the Reach of the Global,” in ibid., 285-434.
the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Harvard Univer[17]. Some his early scholarship includes After Im- sity Press, 2014). For a critique of Piketty, see Chris Giles,
perialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, “Piketty Findings Undercut by Errors,” Financial Times
1921–1931 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); (March 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/
Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, e1f343ca-e281-11e3-89fd-00144feabdc0.html#
1897-1911 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); axzz33ixedkJL. For a thoughtful assessment of miland Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, lennial Marxism, see Timothy Shenk, “Thomas Piketty
1941-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). and Millennial Marxists on the Scourge of Inequality,”
His more recent scholarship includes “The Internation- The Nation (May 2014), http://www.thenation.com/
alization of History,” American Historical Review 94, no. article/179337/thomas-piketty-and-millennial-marxists1 (February 1989): 1-10; Cultural Internationalism and scourge-inequality?
World Order (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
[21]. Relevant commentary includes “The Onrush1997); Global Community; and, with Petra Goedde, “Ining Wave,” The Economist (January 2014), http://www.
troduction: Human Rights as History,” in The Human economist.com/news/briefing/ 21594264-previousRights Revolution: An International History, ed. Akira technological-innovation-has-always-delivered-moreIriye, Petra Goedde, and William Hitchcock (New York: long-run-employment-not-less; Tyler Cowen, “The
Oxford University Press, 2012), 3-24. Some wider reflec- Robots Are Here,” Politico Magazine (November 2013),
tions about cosmopolitanism include Kwame Anthony
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers
2013/11/the-robots-are-here-98995.html#.U4_CpV60b1p;
(New York: Penguin, 2006); Pheng Cheah and Bruce Rob- Dereck Thompson, “What Jobs Will the Robots
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Take? ”
The Atlantic (January 2014), http:
//www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2014/01/what-jobs-will-the-robots-take/283239; Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History
(New York: Henry Holt, 2014); and “A Sensitive Matter,”
The Economist (March 2013), http://www.economist.

com/news/science-and-technology/21574461climate-may-be-heating-up-less-responsegreenhouse-gas-emissions.
[22]. The reference is to H. G. Wells, The Outline of
History: Being a Plain History of Life and Mankind (New
York: Macmillan, 1920).

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at:
https://networks.h-net.org/h-diplo
Citation: Ryan M. Irwin. Review of Iriye, Akira, Global Interdependence: The World after 1945. H-Diplo, H-Net
Reviews. July, 2014.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=40873
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoncommercialNo Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

6

